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"I leaned back against the msasa tree and lay still, trying not to think about the House of 
Hunger where the acids of gut-rot had beaten into the base metal of my brains. The 
House has now become my mind; and I do not like the way the roof is rattling". 
DAMBUDZO MARECHERA : THE HOUSE OF HUNGER 
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SECTION I 
INTRODUCTION 
As the first decade of independence drew to a close in Zimbabwe, there were increasing 
indications, particularly in the urban areas, of growing disillusionment with the 
operations of the Zimbabwean State. In September 1988, University students took to 
the streets in protest against what they saw as the growing tide of corruption within the 
State and Party machinery. In the following months, a major expose' in a national 
newspaper, The Chronicle, catalogued high-level corruption in the State involving the 
illegal sales of motor vehicles. Also in 1988, Parliamentarians, usually noted for their 
sycophancy, apathy and empty cant, spoke out in a brief but vigorous flurry of criticism 
against nepotism and corruption. In April 1989, just over a year after the signing of the 
Unity Accord between ZANU (PF) and PF-ZAPU, a new challenge to the Government 
emerged in the form of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) with the latter 
campaigning basically on an anti-corruption and anti-one-party state platform. As the 
country moved into the last quarter of 1989, students again demonstrated in early 
October following the detention of the president and secretary-general of the Students' 
Representative Council. Finally, between April and June 1990, the State had to confront 
a protracted series of strikes in the public sector. The reaction of the State to these 
developments was at one level to reveal an aggressive stance. In 1988, response to the 
students' demonstrations, students and lecturers were threatened with detention, hastily 
arraigned before the courts on charges that could not stand the tests of judicial demands, 
and a Kenyan lecturer was deported. The State's response to the 1989 student protests 
was even harsher, leading to student detention and the summary closure of the 
University of Zimbabwe on 4 October 1989. Two days before the closure, the president 
of the Students' Representative Council strongly attacked the State, noting that, "the 
institution of Government has thus been rendered completely disreputable and hence 
the incumbents have lost legitimacy" (Mutambara 1989). In an allied move, the 
Secretary-General of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, Morgan Tsvangirai, was 
also detained by the State authorities because of his criticism of the closure of the 
University as "a clear manifestation of rising State, repression, which has already been 
felt by various sections of society" (The Chronicle^ 7 October 1989). As regards the 
opposition party, ZUM, several of its members were detained, and the operations of the 
party made difficult. 
Yet there has been more to the State's response to criticisms than coercive interventions. 
As a result of struggles between sections of civil society and the State, as well as conflicts 
within the executive, legislature and judiciary wings of the State, and the highest organs 
of the ruling party, there have developed important arenas of democratic debate and 
participation in Zimbabwean society. There still exists a substantial degree of Press 
freedom in which regular debates and criticisms of the Government can be found, 
Alongside State-influenced papers, can be found an important array of privately 
sponsored monthly magazines, such as Moto, Parade and SAPEM, as well as a weekly 
newspaper, The Financial Gazette. Regular discussions and debates are held in fora 
organised by intellectuals and attended by enthusiastic audiences. When this is added 
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to regular elections which have on the whole been "free and fair", it can be seen that 
there is a vibrant struggle for democracy in Zimbabwe. An important basis of this 
struggle has been the growth and expansion of the Black petty-bourgeoisie which has 
developed after a decade of experience in public sector management, the large formal 
business sector and the emerging business sub-sector. Emerging from the experiences 
has been an increasing desire to become established, private businessmen. The basis of 
the tendency has been the limits on capital accumulations in the State, continued White 
control of the economy, and the proclivity for macro-economic policy to favour the 
monopolistic sector of the business community. Moreover, as large sections of the Black 
petty-bourgeoisie have found themselves excluded from the benefits of the post-colonial 
policy of "Reconciliation", demands have grown for more active participation not only 
in the economy but in the political process. These demands have resonated both 
amongst the petty-bourgeoisie in opposition, and within the State and Party structures. 
Moreover, even as the State has lost legitimacy amongst sections of the urban 
population, it has retained a popular presence amongst the majority rural producers. 
Nevertheless, it is not a support base it can take for granted in the absence of a substantial 
land reform programme. In addition, in terms of an overall alternative within 
Zimbabwe, the rightist drift of ZUM brought little hope of confronting the existing 
inequalities in the society. Thus as the united ZANU (PF) party takes the country into 
a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) seeking, in the words of the Senior Minister 
of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, to "shift quite decisively away from 
a command economy to one which promotes free markets and private enterprises (The 
Financial Gazette, 28 March 1991), there do not appear to be easily identifiable 
alternatives in Zimbabwe. 
There has therefore been an ambivalence on the part of the State on the question of 
democratic participation and development. On the one hand, the desire to remain 
accountable to the agenda of the liberation movement, however nebulous the precise 
content of that agenda, has not been a fiction. Moreover, there has been a certain 
sensitivity to debates and discussions going on within civil society about such issues. On 
the other hand, an aggressive, heavy-handedness has been shown against certain groups 
in the national body politic, attempting to assert their autonomy from a certain definition 
of the "national interest" in ways considered adventurist and without a viable 
programmatic alternative. At its worst, the latter reaction has been characterised by 
authoritarian prescriptions. 
This ambivalence can be explained at several levels. On the positive side, firstly, the 
continuing debates within the ruling party over such issues as ideology, the one-party 
state and the ESAP. As an example of one trend in the debate, a recent, under-reported 
speech by the Minister of State for the Public Service, Eddison Zvobgo, reflects not only 
the new mood of deregulation in the State, but the class formation and aspirations of 
sections of the ruling elite, as they seek to renegotiate the relationship between the State 
and private business interests developed over the last 11 years. It is worth quoting the 
Minister at length: 
Economic adjustment must be viewed as a matter of life and death. These must be no doubt as to 
the only ideology that works. Everyone must cmbrace pragmatism. What docs not work must be 
discarded. What works must be improved. Poverty - self-inflicted through ignorancc, laziness or 
lack of skills - must be something to be ashamed of. Wealth, honestly and lawfully accumulated, 
must be worthy of praise. 
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It is also true to prosper, our people must be subjected to less and less Government as they become 
truly self-governing. I further submit that for SAP to stand a chance, we, your elected Government, 
must be more and more prepared to dismount from the backs of the people. We must let the 
people go". (The Financial Gazette, 30 May 1991). 
Those amongst the leadership and the mass membership, who still adhere to some 
version of the socialist vision are likely to be at loggerheads with such a view. Moreover, 
the struggles are likely to continue, in view of the increased marginalisation of working 
people that is likely to ensue from the SAP. Secondly, pressures from non-party 
organisations like the student movement, the labour movement and debates amongst 
intellectuals have not been without effect on the democracy debate, broadly defined. 
Thirdly, post-1989 international relations have at one level increased the pressure for a 
liberal political pluralism. 
On the negative side, it is clear that the above trends have taken place within a national 
and international political environment that has moved decidedly to the right. The 
alternatives to capitalism and, more specifically, some form of adjustment programme 
prescribed by the dictates of the West, have become increasingly remote. Thus one of 
the primary functions of a dominant ideology, namely the displacement of questions and 
alternatives to the dominant discourse, has become increasingly operative. Under such 
circumstances, the inability of existing capitalist structures in Africa to deliver little more 
than highly uneven growth in the interest of the few, may well add impetus to an already 
apparent authoritarian strain, in a leadership increasingly under pressure to maintain 
popular support under growing crisis conditions. 
In attempting to examine these issues, three broad questions need to be considered. 
• What factors have affected the organisation and mode of struggle of political and 
social forces in post-1980 Zimbabwe? 
• What forms have these struggles taken? 
• What are likely to be the determinants, at both a national and international level, of 
the political economy of Zimbabwe in the near future? 
Before turning to these issues, there is a need to make some general comments on the 
current debates over the State and civil society in Africa. 
SECTION n 
THE STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY 
The dismal record of "post-colonial" states, both "conservative" and "radical", a less 
messianic concern with certain popular classes, and a more critical perception of 
liberation movements, have necessitated a closer examination of the totality of the State, 
the constitutive forces of civil society and the struggle for democracy. Post-colonial 
states unable to sustain not only hegemonic projects but even more confined corporate 
efforts, because of their inability to consistently deliver the goods to their various 
constituents, have sought security in repressive regimes. Moreover, the deconstruction 
of nationalism and the nation has revealed a less unified anti-colonial experience, which 
has had its effects in post-colonial attempts at mobilisation (Chabal 1986). 
Thus as post-colonial states have failed to carry out their major tasks of consolidating 
nation states, unifying the various social and political forces through democratic 
structures and an accountable state, and providing effective economic strategies for 
growth and redistribution, the role attributed to the State has "changed from the prime 
mover of development to that of its main obstacle" (Doornbos 1990,183). Under such 
conditions, issues concerning democratisation and the critique of the one-party state 
have become central to the development process, and can no longer be submerged under 
the rhetoric of "developmentalism". Yet it is this very area of the nature of the social 
forces capable of carrying out alternative democratic strategies that constitutes a major 
problem area for radical theory and practice. The first problem to be faced in discussing 
the social forces in civil society in Africa is the problem of their production and 
reproduction in conditions of underdevelopment. This problem becomes particularly 
acute in conditions of ecological disaster in which the material basis of survival is being 
eroded. The second problem relates to the manichean opposition that is often posed 
between the State and civil society, in which the former is seen as the sphere of 
oppression and coercion, and the latter as unproblematically, the arena of choice, 
voluntary action and freedom. This can often Ieatf to analysis of the post-colonial State 
as monolithic and to a romanticisation of soda] movements, under conditions in which 
coercion may have been one of the integral principles of civil society. Mamdani has 
criticised such a dichotomy among certain North American Africanists, writing that 
while State-centred theorists "see in civil society nothing but an ensemble of 
'particularisms'" their society-centred counterparts "tend to glamorise civil society and 
present it as non-contradictory" (Mamdani 1989,23). 
Amongst the African Left themselves, there has been a vigorous debate about the 
relationship between the autonomous forces of civil society and the State. Shivji has 
criticised large sections of the Left in Africa for their "entrist" position on the 
post-colonial state and ruling party. That is, he has criticised the belief that the Left can 
enter either the post-colonial state or party and attempt to change these organs from 
within. According to Shivji, this strategy is based on an unscientific understanding of 
the class nature of such post-colonial institutions, and the end result is that the Left itself 
is captured by such institutions. He, therefore, advises the Left to work for the creation 
of autonomous organisations for working people in civil society (Shivji 1988, 1990). 
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Shivji's criticisms are an important reminder of the structural imperatives underlying 
the activities of the State. However, they underestimate the contradictions within the 
State and present the latter as something of a monolith. In addition, while this critique 
points to the importance of the development of autonomous, non-state organisations of 
working people, the analysis fails to delineate the type of relationships that such 
movements could establish with the State under particular conditions. This, in turn, can 
lead to an underestimation of State power and the role of sections of the. 
petty-bourgeoisie as well as an idealisation of these autonomous organisations (B. 
Raftopoulos 1989, 6-7). 
In a similar vein, the Social Movements project being carried out by CODESRIA has 
been criticised for underplaying the pivotal role of the African petty-bourgeoisie as the 
logical inheritor of State power, underestimating the marginalised status of the popular 
classes, and developing a romantic, apocalyptic vision of popular democracy (Mandaza 
1990, 27). The point of such critiques is neither to reassert an elitist conception of 
change, nor to underestimate the struggles of popular classes and organisations. It is, 
however, to place such struggles within the context of the limiting pressures in which 
they are forced to take place. It is, moreover, to remind ourselves of what Eric 
Hobsbawm has written about class relationships: 
Class is not merely a relationship between groups, it is also their existence within a social, cultural 
and institutional framework set by those above. The world of the poor, however elaborate, 
self-contained and separate, is a subaltern and therefore, in some senses, incomplete world; for it 
normally takes for granted the existence of those who have hegemony, or at any rate, its inability for 
most of the time to do much about it. It accepts their hegemony, even when it challenges some of 
its implications, bccause, largely, it has to. Ideas, models and situations in which action becomes 
possible tend to reach it from outside if only bccausc the initiative that changcs conditions on a 
national scale comes from above, or because the mechanisms for diffusing ideas are generated 
outside. (Hobsbawm 1984,39). 
To the extent that civil societies exist in African social formations, the petty-bourgeoisie 
constitute on important element in this arena. Clearly, the petty-bourgeoisie, through 
their monopolised access to education, their limited access to colonial State structures, 
their experiences in leading oppositional organisational structures during anti-colonial 
struggles, their ability to articulate an inclusive national political discourse, and because 
of the structural and organisational weakness of the other oppressed classes, are in the 
best position to assume the reins of State power in the post-colonial period. However, 
in the post-colonial period, the petty-bourgeoisie develops serious problems in its 
attempts to extend its hegemonic rule over society. This is because, while hegemony is 
ethical-political and cultural, "it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on 
the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic 
activity" (Gramsci 1982, 161). Thus while the petty-bourgeoisie is able during the 
anti-colonial struggle to exert a cultural political and ethical hegemony, this influence 
is eroded during the post-colonial phase due to the fact that the petty-bourgeoisie does 
not control substantive social property of its own in the area of the economy. It is, 
therefore, extremely prone to utilising the State as a basis for accumulation and class 
formation. 
In addition, because the colonial State inherited at independence was built largely on 
the basis of coercion and a command relationship with civil society, the 
petty-bourgeoisie, because of the problems of accumulation in the economy, the lack of 
democratic structures, and weakness of civil formations and popular organisations, tends 
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to use the State increasingly as a basis for corruption, internecine struggles, and as a 
coercive force against the unsatisfied demands of the popular classes. Under such 
conditions, the world-view of sections of the State petty-bourgeoisie becomes 
increasingly factional, with the dominant class displaying a decreasing ability to 
incorporate the interest and demands of the direct producers, and conversely showing 
an increasing inability to make sacrifices of a corporate nature. Given that the 
post-colonial State is thereby so embroiled in the factional struggles and ambitions of 
the petty-bourgeoisie, and therefore lacks the level of autonomy which can pretend to 
a certain universality of outlook, struggles develop within the State. In such struggles, 
the State is not simply an external force that confronts civil society, it is at the same time 
a locus of conflict of forces whose springboard is sometimes civil society. Here State 
power not only places formative pressures on and brings into existence certain elements 
of civil society, it also manifests the balance of forces emerging from the latter 
(Mamdani 1990, 7-8); Kaviraj 1990, 12). In Southern Africa, the specifities of the 
"post-white settler colonial state" provide the trajectory for the democratic struggles in 
the region. These specific issues include the pervasive legacy of economic power of both 
the White community and international capital, and the aspirations and expectations of 
the various sections of the dominated classes, developed during the nationalist 
independence struggle and which take on new features in the post-colonial period 
(Mandaza 1991,46). 
SECTION m 
THE PETTY-BOURGEOISIE, THE STATE AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR HEGEMONY 
ZANU (PF) came to power in 1980 with a substantive national support base, but also 
against a background of serious divisions within the Nationalist Movement, as well as a 
differentiated experience of the liberation struggle. The hegemony of the Nationalist 
Movement was, therefore, always problematic and a process that was not established 
once and for all, but had to be, and still has to be fought for and reaffirmed on a continual 
basis, amidst contradictions and contestations. In this respect there has been some 
important recent work deconstructing the experiences of the liberation struggle and 
nationalist ideology. Kriger (1988) criticises Ranger for not integrating issues of 
"gender, lineage, generation and intra as well as inter-class conflicts" into his concept of 
an inclusive peasant consciousness. Kriger's own argument points to the contradictions 
of colonial society amongst the oppressed which were revealed by the coercive reality 
of the liberation struggle, and which fragmentation provided the differing modalities for 
experiencing the liberation war in Zimbabwe. Similarly, Sylvester (1990a) talks about 
the experience of the anti-colonial struggle producing "a plurality of differences which 
have not been fully neutralised, coopted or destroyed". More specifically, Sylvester 
summarises her argument as being that Zimbabwe experienced four "simultaneous 
revolutions" which, while they affected certain aspects of consciousness, social structure, 
state and economy, failed to provide an hegemonic discourse that would sufficiently 
integrate the concerns of these "competing centres of force". 
The problem with both Kriger and Sylvester is that they stress differences without a 
strong conception of articulation, and theorise competing centres of power without a 
sufficient conception of hegemony. Against Kriger's view, it is necessary to point out 
that social groups have several sets of interests which are often contradictory and even 
mutually exclusive. Zimbabweans may have followed their class, gender and 
generational interests during the war, while still contributing to the hegemony of 
nationalism. As Hall (1988) has reminded us, the achievement of hegemony "never has 
only one character, only a predominant tendency; it is always "destruction and 
reconstruction or what Gramsci elsewhere calls "revolution/restoration"! 
Moreover, interests themselves are not statically ascribed to particular positions within 
a social structure but are constructed historically through the ideological process, in 
which an important element in Zimbabwe has been the formative influences of 
nationalism. In Sylvester's case, the attempt to select only certain elements of the 
liberation struggle (ZIPA and March 11th Movement) as anti-passive revolutions, fails 
to understand the nationalist struggle as a whole as an anti-passive movement, however 
contradictory and fraught with tensions. Perhaps more important than explaining the 
failure of movements such as ZIPA, is to explain the more lasting resonance of "old 
guard" nationalism and its ability to mobilise people for political action, by providing 
them with elements of a world view that makes "good sense" of prevailing social relations. 
While it is important to demystify the nationalist discourse and point to its contradictory 
elements, it is unwise to underestimate the contradictory unity of the discourse 
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particularly in former settler societies, where the broad struggle against racist structures 
still has a popular resonance. The experience of "nation" is constructed out of a 
conception of organic unity which purports that what people share as a nation is more 
important than the conditions that divide them by class, gender or generation. Such 
experiences of nationality and nation "are made in the active elaboration of a national 
tradition, a making of a usable past that underlies their claims to political recognition, 
autonomy, sovereignty or independence" (Suny 1990, 9). These ideological trends 
develop from specific lived experiences of community, with attachments to particular 
places, extending through experiences of communities in struggle, under attack, and 
reaffirming and extending the existence of such communities through involvement in 
collective institutions and movement (Williams, 1989). While this process was 
experienced unevenly during the entire anti-colonial struggle, the dominance of 
nationalism as an organising framework should not be underrated. 
From Growth with Equity to Structural Adjustment 
Given the contradictory and in some respects fragile unity of the Nationalist Movement, 
the new Government in 1980 faced a daunting prospect in attempting to consolidate and 
develop the support of the popular classes as well as attempting to placate the 
persistently predatory aspirations of capital. In consequence, the new Government 
initiated the policy of "Reconciliation", a necessary acceptance of existing production 
relations in the face of the balance of social forces in the country and the region. 
Through this policy, the State sought both to ensure a continuity of production 
structures, as well as initiating the process of ameliorating the conditions of the working 
people. In policy terms, the strategy of "Growth with Equity" was the economic 
expression of the politics of Reconciliation. Faced with the dilemma of a support base 
eager to gain greater access to production assets and social services, and an apprehensive 
White minority who needed reassurances and guarantees, the Government sought 
through "Growth with Equity" to provide a high rate of growth which would permit a 
certain level of mass social expenditure without adversely affecting the livelihood of the 
minority group. Thus the policy called for high growth rates to avoid a zero-zum 
predicament (Mkandawire 1985, 247). 
Hence the new Government set out to build its hegemony in a situation where it had no 
fundamental control over the productive forces in the country, and therefore had to rely 
on the investment decisions of private capital, both local and foreign, to provide the 
economic growth necessary to initiate its policy programmes. Furthermore, the 
Government's economic strategy exposed the serious contradictions inherent in 
attempting to reconcile the demands of capital accumulation with the desire for political 
legitimacy. For in courting the approval of capital, the Zimbabwe Government initiated 
a series of policies that were not beneficial to the popular classes. Thus the Government 
faced the central dilemma of a welfarist strategy, namely how to reconcile growth with 
a more equitable distribution of resources, and initiate change without serious 
destabilisation. 
The Transitional National Development Plan predicted a growth rate of 8.2% between 
the years 1982-1985. The basis of this optimistic figure was the brief economic boom of 
the immediate post-independence years of 1980-81, and the naive belief in economic 
recovery in the West. In reality, however, the expectations had an extremely fragile 
basis. For the 1980-81 boom was based more on increased consumer demand, 
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stimulated by minimum wage increases, and the using up of excess production capacity 
than on any sustained new investment input. In fact, a major structural feature of the 
economy has been the decline of gross fixed capital formation. The latter reached its 
peak of 28% of GDP in 1975, but experienced a drastic decline towards the end of the 
1970s such that by 1980, it was 15.3%ofGDP. Between 1983 and 1986 gross fixed capital 
formation averaged about 13% of GDP, while net investment averaged 3.6% of GDP. 
Thus the post-independence period has been characterised by a continuous decline in 
the share of the private sector in gross fixed capital formation, and by an increase in the 
share of the public sector. The effects of this low level of gross fixed capital formation 
have been exacerbated by the asset structure of such capital formation. That is, in the 
private sector investment has mainly been concerned with replacement by relatively 
modern and capital-intensive machinery and equipment; while in the public sector the 
concentration has been on large civil engineering projects and buildings. Thus 
investment has not favoured the expansion of new productive capacity (Government of 
Zimbabwe/ILO 1989). 
After the boom years of 1980-82 in which the State was able to initiate, in a substantive 
manner, its welfarist programmes particularly in health and education, a period of 
decline set in. When the low level of gross fixed capital formation was combined with 
decreased export earnings, the adverse effects of destabilisation and drought, the result 
was a reduced gross domestic product which averaged 3.2% per annum between 
1980-87, falling short of the projected 8% annual growth rate. The Budget deficit grew 
rapidly in response to the Government's social expenditure programmes and the 
provisions of emergency drought relief. In the face of a deepening recession, the 
Zimbabwe Government turned to the IMF in 1982. The conditionality of the IMF 
included a devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, and a reduction of Government 
subsidies and the overall Budget deficit. The Government also liberalised the capital 
account in an attempt to attract investment. In the event, the Government's 
commitment to its social expenditure programme and its provision of drought relief 
meant that it was unable to comply with the IMF's deflationary programme. Moreover, 
a dramatic increase in net investment abroad led to a Government-imposed embargo 
on further remittable surpluses abroad. In February 1984, the IMF programme 
collapsed. 
The continued problems of low investment in the Zimbabwean economy have been 
compounded by the speculative nature of existing investment. Fast profits from 
investment in real estate and the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange have directed investment 
away from production into speculation. Moreover, the major banks in the country have 
been extremely reluctant to provide investments for new productive ventures 
(Cokorinos 1990,12-13). When allied to the investment problem, the rapid growth of 
unemployment, and pressure from capital within the country and international finance 
organisations, led to the State's introduction of further measures to attract foreign 
capital. 
Thus in April 1989, a new Investment Code was initiated which restated certain 
measures that were already in existence, but in addition introduced four new changes. 
These included: The establishment of an Investment Centre to streamline the process 
of approving new investment proposals; narrowing the definition of a foreign company, 
thus reducing the number of firms subject to the additional controls applied to foreign 
firms; allowing selected new investments to repatriate up to 100% of profits subject to 
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the suitability of each case, and the signing of MIGA and OPIC investment guarantee 
protocols. 
After the collapse of the IMF programme in 1984, the Government's economic policies 
were characterised by a mix between an orthodox economic programme and a political 
commitment to expenditure on social services and the continued, though declining, 
provision of subsidies (Bratton & Burgess 1987,204; Lehman 1990, 66). On the basis 
of this "home-grown" adjustment programme, the State was able to restore a balance of 
payments surplus, reduce the debt servicing ratio from 40% to 25% and generate an 
average growth rate of 4.2% from 1985-1990 (Cliffe 1991, 28). Yet even with such a 
relatively successful programme, developed despite the imperatives of the IMF and 
World Bank, the Government of Zimbabwe announced a major economic structural 
adjustment programme in January 1991. The programme predictably includes: a 
deregulation of price and wage controls; the elimination of subsidies; a reduction of the 
Budget deficit through the reduction of social services and introduction of cost recovery 
measures; and a trade liberalisation programme phased over five years (Government of 
Zimbabwe 1991). 
Thus the State has moved from a welfarist economic strategy to a Structural Adjustment 
Programme, which, if carried out comprehensively, is likely to seriously undermine its 
past reformist strategy. Furthermore, the decline in social service delivery will probably 
remove an important platform for mobilising popular support. If this strategy is 
combined with a land reform programme which does not deliver the goods, the 
long-term support base of the Government could be seriously eroded. Yet in full 
knowledge of the deleterious political effects of such a policy, the adjustment 
programme has not so much been sold to the Zimbabwean population, as imposed as 
the only practical alternative, by the State and business elite. The reasons for the 
decisions are varied. Clearly, as Cliffe (Ibid, page 28) has noted, the World Bank's 
influence has greatly increased in Zimbabwe. Secondly, this growing influence itself 
reflects the changed international balance of forces in which socialism no longer appears 
to be a viable alternative, at least not in what used to be its really existing forms. The 
failure to develop alternative socialist policies was recently noted by President Robert 
Mugabe at the Central Committee meeting of ZANU (PF) in March 1991. He admitted 
that, "we have not in our possession as a party, a clear definition of socialism as we would 
want to see it applied in our society". Continuing, President Mugabe observed that, the 
"sheer weight of capitalism could very well set off course, even though our socialist 
commitment might in theory continue" (Financial Gazette, 28 March 1991). In the 
current environment in which the political centre of gravity has moved to the right not 
only in Zimbabwe, but in most of the Southern African region, the Structural 
Adjustment Programme is being presented as a necessity, in the full confidence that no 
viable radical alternatives are being presented by any organised social forces in the 
country. We shall have more to say on this later. 
However, it is also necessary to reiterate what was noted earlier, namely, that the SAP, 
amongst other issues, remains a matter of serious debate within the ruling party. Yet, 
in terms of the specific content of policy issues, certain State structures tend to lead the 
Party. With neither a strong independent research nor financial capacity 
(notwithstanding the Ministry of Political Affairs), the Party has not been able to develop 
a strong policy formulating base (Moyo, 1991). There is a strong impression that 
economic policy formulation has been centralised v/ithin the Presidency, and the senior 
echelons within the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, and 
10 
Industry and Commerce. A wide range of Party and Ministry officials, for example, 
appear to have been marginalised in the formulation of the SAlP. In general, the party 
cadres at the middle level tend to be utilised more as mass mobilisers and implementors, 
than as effective contributors to policy formulation. Moreover, as Moyo (Ibid) observes, 
"many professionals of middle-class background find themselves marginalised from 
inner party politics by the 'mobilised social force and, at times, by high-ranking party 
leadership". The Party thus retains a middle-level functionary cadre with greater 
political than policy skills. Another dimension of the problem relates to the relationship 
between the State and the private sector. The internal brain drain from the public to 
the private sector has for some time presented problems in terms of the State's capacity 
to deal with the private sector (Raftopoulos et al 1986). If conditions in the public sector 
continue to deteriorate, the effects of the SAP are likely to increase the loss of 
professional and skilled personnel to the private sector, both to existing and new 
enterprises, as well as to the NGOs. This will, in turn, reduce the ability of the State to 
manage the SAP, and in general to cope with the increasing strength of the private sector. 
Already, the preparations and information campaigns by employer organisations with 
regard to SAP have overwhelmed the efforts of the Government and taken the initiative 
from the State. The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) has also used this 
opportunity to reassert its central role in industry, after the high-profile interventions 
during the last six months of the newly formed Indigenous Business Development 
Centre. (More will be said of this below). The State's lack of consultations with groups 
other than employers' organisations has been a glaring deficiency. The growing 
confidence of the White business elite has become apparent on a daily basis. The close 
cooperation between employer organisations and senior State officials has been hailed 
by the business sector. Never in the last 11 years has the private sector been more 
confident of its relationship with the State than it is at present. The technicist confidence 
of SAP discourse, currently the preferred medium of intervention for the White business 
elite, has provided the double-speak necessary to attempt to camouflage the continued 
growth of substantive economic power amongst a minority class. As devaluation of the 
Zimbabwean dollar increases, access to foreign bank accounts means access to foreign 
exchange in times of scarcity. The result is increases in wealth for considerable sections 
of the elite, and a smaller section of the growing Black elite, who are linked to foreign 
capital or act as local agents for foreign concerns. It is important to note, in addition, 
that for the White elite, SAP is also a cultural jssue. Still relatively isolated in their 
exclusive social world, behind the high concrete walls surrounding their homes, SAP, 
like their satellite dishes, provides more contact with a Western ethos in which they feel 
most comfortable. It is the possibility of a break in such links that provides for them a 
terrifying prospect. 
We have now to ask to what extent the Government's Reconciliation strategy and its 
attendant economic policies have benefited the African petty-bourgeoisie. Predictably, 
for sections of this petty-bourgeoisie, independence has brought with it new openings 
for advancement and enrichment. This is particularly the case in the State, which has 
been effectively Africanised, and which has offered, at the top echelons of the public 
service, relatively high salaries and opportunities to use the State for accumulation 
purposes. Thus sections of the State petty-bourgeoisie moved into positions with highly 
differentiated salary structures inherited from the settler state. Accompanying such 
positions has been the entire ethos of suburban lifestyles and the structural pressures 
for further acquisition and accumulation engendered by the dominant capitalist 
relations of production. However, as has been noted, one of the major consequences of 
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Reconciliation was a "reconciliation with capital" (Sibanda 1988) and, more specifically, 
an initial acceptance of White control over the private sector. Given this lack of control 
over the private means of accumulation, sections of the petty-bourgeoisie, as in other 
Third World formations, have used the State as a means of accumulation through 
corruptive practices. The first quarter of 1989 thus proved for Zimbabwe yet another 
political trauma. The Sandura Commission, set up by the President to investigate direct 
car sales to individuals by Willowvale Motor Industries, became a household name in 
the country. Five Ministers - two Political Affairs, Higher Education, Industry and 
Technology, and Defence - and the Governor of Matabeleland North resigned as a result 
of the Commission. President Mugabe was clear in spelling out some of the implications 
of the Sandura findings. In a statement issued after a Central Committee meeting on 
23 March 1989, President Mugabe declared: 
We must now admit we are reaping the bitter fruits of our unwholesomeness and negative 
behaviour. Our image as leaders of the Party and Government has never been so badly tarnished. 
The public are crying for our blood and they certainly are entitled to do so after watching our 
actions and conduct over the nine years of our Government (The Herald, 23 March 1989). 
The saga of the Commission's proceedings contained all the ingredients of an epic 
tragedy: an heroic liberation struggle, the transfer of power, the making of individual 
reputations within the broader framework of social transformation; and then the 
antithesis, of the corrupting influence of power, the untidy, grubby manipulations of 
accumulation, the trial, exposure and, in one case, suicide. To many analysts, this process 
represented the almost ineluctable logic of the propensity of the political elite to 
accumulate at any cost; the ubiquitous neo-colonial denouement of the predictable 
petty-bourgeoisie project. 
For weeks, crowds would converge on the legal arena to witness certain members of the 
leadership confronted with their misdeeds. As the events unfolded, what was indeed a 
tragedy began to take on the less dignified features of farce, as leading figures uttered 
one unceremonious untruth after another, much to the disdain of an incredulous crowd. 
As the unsavoury details became more apparent, the indignities of dishonest leaders 
were manifested through arrogance, contempt for the due process of law, intimations 
of being above the law, and a clear disdain for public accountability. In a fit of frustrated 
rage, one Minister rebuked the eager audience-participants with the sarcastic outburst: 
"One fool at a time." 
One could speculate that for the court audience and most of the reading and listening 
public, Willowgate was something of a cathartic experience. As people watched, 
listened and read about the details of leadership corruption, each appeared to confront 
publicly what many had been talking about in the street, bars, buses and homes: namely, 
whatever hopes of radical transformation that might have been fostered in the past 
appeared to have run aground. Equally, or perhaps more importantly, was the feeling 
of people witnessing their own insecurities in Zimbabwean society at the highest levels 
of the political machinery. For in truth, it must be said that, not surprisingly, there was 
an ambivalence in the critical attitude of the "povo". On the one hand, a clear and 
understandable desire to partake of the commodified milieu of Zimbabwe's dominant 
capitalist economy, and an ambiguous envy and admiration for those most able to enjoy 
the exploitative relations of the market and a privileged access to the State. On the other 
hand, a sense of grievance at the growing polarities of privilege and the abuse of power 
by leaders who, week after week, mouthed the benefits of less acquisitive forms of 
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existence. The sum total of the critical posture was not so much an anti-capitalist protest, 
but a more limited questioning of the procedures of distribution within Ihe "acceptable" 
limits of capitalism. 
However, one of the most disturbing features of the Sandura Commission revelations 
was President Mugabe's pardon for the guilty Ministers concerned. The President 
appeared to downplay the seriousness of the crime of perjury committed by senior State 
officials, and more seriously appeared to place the latter above the full consequences of 
the law. This brought the contradictions of the application of the law under popular 
scrutiny and added to the uneasiness concerning the State's actions, and the partiality 
of the law. A second important feature of the Sandura findings was the evidence of 
growing linkages of members of the State elite and businessmen in the private sector, 
in a web of corrupting practices. 
Turning to the African petty-bourgeoisie in the private sector, there is evidence of 
growing fustration amongst this group. During the colonial period, the few African 
businessmen that were operating in the private sector were active in the fields of retailing 
and transport. In agriculture, there were a limited number of small-scale farmers in the 
Purchase Areas. However, the ambitions of the aspiring black petty-bourgeoisie 
seriously proscibed by the structures of the settler state. Firstly, the operations of most 
small black businessmen were eliminated from the towns and confined to the "locations" 
and to some freehold plots adjacent to them. Secondly, African trading was increasingly 
made subject to discriminatory legislation (Wild 1989). The stifling of African 
petty-bourgeoisie aspirations was apparent throughout the professions and became one 
of the formative grievances of the nationalist elite. 
While the Presidential Directive ensured the rapid Africanisation of the public sector, 
no such instrument was used in the private sector for reasons that will become apparent 
later. Thus, judging from recent statistics, the Black petty-bourgeoisie in the private 
sector continue to face serious constraints in moving into the top echelons of the 
occupational structure. A 1989 report on Black advancement in the private sector 
showed the following racial distribution at management level: Senior Management -
62.5% (White), 37.5% (Black); Middle Management - 35.5% (White), 64.5% (Black); 
Junior Management - 22% (White) and 78% (Black). Commenting on the pace of 
Black advancement, the author of the report noted: 
One of the primary factors affecting the pace and nalu e of Black advancement in industry is the 
racial attitudes of White management. There is still White management at all levels that believes 
Blacks are incompetent and cannot do the job. These attitudes reflect insecurity, but also feelings 
of superiority and inability or lack of desire to come to terms with the new social and political 
environment (Strachan, 1989). 
This problem is compounded by the fact that with the limited industrial expansion that 
has taken place over the last ten years, not many new top management jobs have been 
created. 
Notwithstanding the denunciations of the Press and the Government on the obstacles 
to Black advancement in the private sector, the State has been very unclear about its 
long-term policy and strategy on the latter issue. The result has been a resort to 
intermittent "threats" to the private sector, outside of a comprehensive policy. The State 
petty-bourgeoisie, because of the policy of reconciliation, have hesitated in introducing 
any definitive policy, resembling the Presidential Directive in the public sector which 
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effectively Africanised the latter within the first five years of independence. Where 
Black advancement has taken place in the private sector, it has done so mainly at skilled 
and middle management levels. Many White "workers" were either declassed through 
emigration (the highest average of economically active emigrants was in the production 
and related workers category, with an average of 1 124 over the years 1965-1985) or 
promoted into higher supervisory positions. In the alliance that constituted settler rule 
in Zimbabwe, namely the White agrarian bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeoisie and 
workers, supported by international capital, White workers as a force have become 
either redundant or expendable. In some cases, White-dominated unions simply 
dissolved themselves in order to avoid the leadership of Blacks, and to avoid their 
financial assets falling into the hands of Black workers. It is no accident, therefore, that 
the most vocal proponents of Black advancement have not been Black workers, whose 
major grievances have related to the broader areas pertaining to the conditions of labour 
(i.e. wages, unions, etc). 
Predictably, therefore, the most ardent advocates of Black advancement have emerged 
from the middle occupational groups. Moreover, even where Black advancement has 
taken place, there has been a significant amount of window-dressing appointments, 
which have, in turn, resulted in two major problems. Firstly, such appointments often 
lost credibility because of their ineffectiveness within the company. These employees 
entered the racist employment structures of capital, and have often been neutralised 
and absorbed. Secondly, those public servants who were poached by the private sector 
because of their assumed knowledge of the Government machinery and Government 
contacts, often lost credibility with the State itself. In addition, White employers began 
to develop their own linkages and lobby groups with the State, and have developed a 
decreasing need for such ex-State official intermediaries. 
For those Blacks in top executive positions, the issue of Africanisation has, in most cases, 
been a mute point. Firstly, they are more interested in not disturbing the mechanics of 
accumulation in the economy than in eradicating racist occupational practices. (There 
is, of course, always a formal and indignant opposition to racism). Secondly, for the few 
who have been inclined to tackle the issue, their executive powers are often curtailed by 
the power of their White colleagues. Moreover, in the final analysis, their own positions 
are partly dependent on the patronage of the White management. 
Blacks in the private sector have also had problems in attempting to develop small 
businesses. The Government's attitude to the African entrepreneur has been 
characterised by an ambivalence and lack of forcefulness, because of several reasons. 
Firstly, the uncertainty of the State in defining its relationship with other private capital, 
that is transnational and domestic non-African capital. Moreover, the situation is 
exacerbated with the growing linkages and relationships between sections of the State 
elite and large capital. Secondly, Africans committed to establishing small businesses 
have, on the whole, lacked academic training and managerial expertise, and also have 
not been able to articulate their views from a strong lobbying position (Ndoro 1989). 
Moreover, credit facilities to aspirant entrepreneurs have been either limited, where 
the State has intervened through organisations such as SEDCO, or "largely inaccessible" 
in the commercial banking sector. As regards the latter, many small businessmen have 
alleged that, "race seemed an important consideration to the commercial banks " 
(Ibid). The problems of Blacks setting up businesses have been highlighted recently in 
a survey of small-scale metal-working industries. Out of 38 companies covered, most of 
which were established after 1980,34 (89%) were owned by Whites, four by Asians and 
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"Coloureds" and two by Blacks. The survey noted that at independence and since 1980, 
there have been few Blacks who have accumulated sufficient capital ?nd skills from 
previous employment, and also developed the necessary social networks in industry to 
go it alone and survive (Halimana, forthcoming). This has serious implications for 
Zimbabwe's Structural Adjustment Programme which places high hopes on the ability 
of new small-scale industries to create employment for the majority population. 
There are a number of reasons why the State has been so diffident on the question of 
African advancement and more substantively African control of the Zimbabwean 
economy. Firstly, as has already been noted, there has been a great deal of policy and 
ideological confusion over the relationship between the public and the private sectors. 
The Government's rhetorical and contradictory commitment to socialism has meant a 
lack of encouragement, in policy support terms, for the growth of Black entrepreneurs. 
In a meeting between the President, senior economic ministers and an emerging 
businessmen's association, the Senior Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and 
Development responded to the continuous criticisms of emerging businessmen by 
stating that: "We were not trying to create a petty-bourgeoisie in this country!"* The 
same organisation was also attacked by the Minister of Industry and Commerce for a 
lack of loyalty to the Government. Secondly, the policy of Reconciliation and living with 
existing capitalist production relations has meant a reluctance to encroach on existing 
property relations. This factor has been exacerbated by the growing links between 
members of the State elite and the business sector (B. Raftopoulos 1990). Thirdly, as 
has been noted for other post-colonial states, where a space or vacuum has formed 
between power and accumulation, indigenous business elites distinct from the 
bureaucracy have developed such spaces to strengthen the force of civil society (Bayart 
1986,116). The Zimbabwean State has until recently been reluctant to see the growth 
of a Black business class who would have an accumulation base independent of the State, 
and through such a base present an alternative political force. 
Yet, recently, existing and aspiring Black businessmen have become more aggressive 
and more organised in lobbying for their programme. In December 1990, the 
Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC) was formed to press for more Black 
participation and control in the Zimbabwean economy. Prior to this, Provincial 
Development Associations in Masvingo, Matabeleland and the Midlands had been 
launched as vehicles through which the economic interests of the Black middle class 
could be more effectively articulated. The ID DC has a membership of about 4,000, 
ranging from informal sector operators to parastatals. Moreover, the structures of the 
IBDC are now found at national, provincial, district and even ward levels. The IBDC 
boasts that it is the only "authentic" national businessmen's association, which also caters 
for the various lobby groups in business which make up its executive board, such as for 
example: the Zimbabwe National Fanners' Union, the Women in Business Group, the 
Zimbabwe Transport Organisation (bus owners), etc. According to the 
Secretary-General, from its inception, the IBDC has had the blessing of the Head of 
State, and it was their deliberate policy to launch the organisation with such high-profile 
support. The IBDC was also launched to coincide with the inauguration of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme and the Land Amendment Act, both seen as opportunities to 
discuss the prospects for the growth of a Black bourgeoisie, under conditions in which 
the Black middle class has felt increasingly marginalised. 
Clearly, the organisation is attempting to mobilise both well-known existing 
businessmen such as Machipisa, Mucheche, Boka, as well as emerging or aspiring 
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businessmen. Moreover, some of the top positions of the organisation (e.g. president 
and vice-president) are filled by ex-civil servants, who have gone into business but 
remain members of the ruling party and retain close links with Party officials at the 
highest level. The policy issues being discussed with the State include the pace of 
Africanisation in the economy, security requirements for borrowing by leading financial 
institutions, and the possible impact of Trade Liberalisation on the future of Black 
businessmen (The Financial Gazette, 23 November 1990). 
On the latter issue, particularly, the IBDC has expressed fears of further marginalisation 
by existing monopolies. In line with these issues, the IBDC has set itself the following 
institutional programme. To establish or to press for: 
a National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND); 
a Business Extension and Advising Services (BESA); 
a National Business Research and Industrial Development Institute (BRIDI); 
an Affirmative Action and Marketing Bureau (AAB); 
an Office of Unfair Trade Practices; 
a Mergers and Monopolies Commission; and 
unlisted Securities Markets (IBDC Programme 1991). 
The State has shown a growing interest in this group after initial neglect, for two reasons. 
Firstly, the economic reform programme has given greater legitimacy to the quest for 
accumulation and the establishment of a Black bourgeoisie. Moreover, the World Bank 
itself, in a study of the construction industry, has called on the Government to "act to 
enhance the indigenous contracting sector by implementing an Affirmative Action 
Sub-Contracting Programme" (World Bank, 1991, 59). In addition, aid organisations 
such as USAID are likely to show a keen interest in such organisations. Secondly, the 
experience of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) demonstrated the ability of an 
alternative party to mobilise frustrated and ambitious members of the Black middle 
class. Elements in the State are therefore keen to stay close to an organisation which is 
pressing forward its version of the national economic question, in tones that appeal to 
sections of the State elite, in search of alternative avenues of accumulation. For their 
part, the IBDC are likely, in the medium term, to exert all their energies into lobbying 
the State and attempting to strengthen linkages with the latter in the absence of a more 
effective means for pressing their demands. Whether or not the IBDC deteriorates into 
yet another vehicle for compradorial aspirations remains an open question. 
Thus while the policy of Reconciliation has opened up certain opportunities for sections 
of the petty-bourgeoisie, especially in the State, those opportunities have been 
proscribed and curtailed by the settler factor and international capital. Moreover, the 
force of capital has been clearly apparent in the political arena where the ruling party 
elite have been quicker to reconcile with the settler elite than the nationalists in opposing 
parties. After the estrangement of PF-ZAPU from ZANU (PF) in the early 1980s, in a 
series of bitter encounters, it took until December 1989 for the two former liberation 
movements to seal their unity pact through a congress. In the meantime, the 
Government has been at pains to reassure the settler constituency about its continued 
commitment to Reconciliation. Thus, when in August 1987, the State terminated the 
20 Parliamentary seats reserved for Whites by the Lancaster House Agreement, an 
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announcement was made in October of the same year, in which 11 of the vacant 20 seats 
were reallocated to representatives of the White community in industry, agriculture and 
commerce. 
It was not that the 20 White reserved seats could, in themselves, have prevented the 
Government from introducing any substantive legislation. For the constraints against 
introducing a comprehensive radical programme were located in the powerful settler 
and international economic forces facing such a possibility: the Lancaster House 
Agreement reflected this balance of forces. Rather the reallocation of 11 of the 20 
formerly reserved seats to privileged economic interests reflected the continued and, in 
some ways, growing strength of capitalist structures in the country. Such a recognition 
gave a greater credibility to the representatives of privilege at a time when they were 
recovering from the initial defensiveness they displayed in the immediate 
post-independence period. That there was a growing self-confidence and recalcitrance 
in the settler community as a whole was apparent from the 1985 elections in which the 
former Rhodesian Front, now Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe, were 
overwhelmingly returned by the White constituency. Overall, the White community has 
benefited from the removal of the reserved seats clause, in that it contributed to a certain 
depoliticisation of their power profile and fed a more heightened technical discourse on 
the economy in more conventional World Bank terms. 
In summing up this section of the discussion, a few points need to be made. Firstly, the 
policy of Reconciliation and the post-colonial state which ensued from it was a result of 
a particular balance offerees in Zimbabwe and the Southern African region. Moreover, 
this balance offerees imposed certain pressures and constraints on policy options which 
worked in favour of a continuation of capitalist relations, of production. Secondly, in 
the context of such a set of social relations, sections of the petty-bourgeoisie have gained 
access to certain avenues of accumulation, most importantly through the mechanisms 
of the State. In important ways, the Unity Agreement between ZANU (PF) and 
PF-ZAPU has been an important political step forward for Zimbabwe. However, given 
the events of the first ten years of independence, there is a real danger that the arguments 
for unity will be used to cloak the consolidation of fragments of the petty-bourgeoisie 
and to police the development of democracy in the country. 
The One-Party State Debate 
Criticism of the policing of democracy through the mechanism of the one-party state 
began in the early 1980s in Zimbabwe, and has been continued vigorously since then. 
Starting with a series of critical articles in magazines like Mo to, and well attended 
debates organised by groups such as the African Association of Political Science 
(Zimbabwe Chapter) and a tradition of grassroots-based democratic theatre of 
discussion (Kaarsholm 1990), the debate reached new heights in the wake of events in 
Eastern Europe in 1989, and the particular articulation of the problem through ZUM, 
and through the student and trade union movements. Explicit in all these debates and 
critical interventions has been a challenge to a particular conception of unity demanding 
the articulation of differences through a one-party state machinery. From radical 
critiques stressing the petty-bourgeoisie avarice of such a project to liberal demands for 
a plurality of political participation, the message has been that the definition of national 
unity and participation in the "imagined community" of the nation has become an 
increasingly contested arena of articulation. 
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The 1987 Unity Agreement between ZANU (PF) and PF-ZAPU was born out of a 
recognition that neither party would proceed on a national level on their own. The 1980 
and 1985 elections confirmed the regional domination of each party and the militarist 
approach adopted after the conflicts in Matabeleland in the early 1980s proved a myopic 
project. The pact has thus brought to a close, provisionally, the open political fighting 
between the two parties, even though unity remains fraught with problems of regional 
balance, compounded by continued ethnic rivalry within the majority Shona leadership 
and their respective support groups. Subsequently, the unity pact, backed by dominant 
electoral support, provided the ruling party with what it perceived to be a de facto 
acceptance of a one-party state. The President led the debate with a series of well-worn 
arguments about unity, and the African tradition in settling internal disputes. In reality, 
the push for a one-party state in Zimbabwe, as in most other African states, has been an 
attempt to consolidate the domination of the State by sections of the petty-bourgeoisie, 
particularly in the face of growing opposition within the country. 
The rhetoric of the one-party state argument attempted to conceal the persistent and 
extended disunities and cleavages that characterise Zimbabwean society. The analysis 
of the Black petty-bourgeoisie in the private sector has already revealed the growing 
frustrations of this class. When these thwarted aspirations were added to the growing 
problems of unemployment, decreased earnings and the housing and transport crisis of 
working people, it provided a sufficient basis for the formation of another party. Into 
this breach stepped the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), led by the former 
Secretary-General of ZANU (PF), Edgar Tekere. ZUM campaigned on two issues that 
continue to be of concern to all classes in the country, namely the one-party state and 
corruption in the State, and articulated these issues in a manner that tapped into the 
popular reservoir of opposition to these issues. In the event, the 1990 elections proved 
an extremely worrying event for the Government. The ruling party election campaign 
was often conducted through crude advertisements, and in a few instances, violence. 
However, President Mugabe was also very concerned to lobby and reassure the various 
interest groups amongst the electorate. Deeply concerned about urban discontent with 
the policies of the Government, President Mugabe held a series of consultative meetings 
with nurses, teachers and the ZCTU, promising improvements to the groups of workers, 
as well as promising more progress on Black advancement. Despite such meetings, the 
election results confirmed the urban swing to ZUM with the latter winning 30% of the 
urban votes. While ZANU (PF) won 116 of the 119 seats contested, with ZUM winning 
two seats and ZANU (Ndonga) one, the "protest vote" for ZUM was significant. 
Similarly, in the Presidential election, while Robert Mugabe received 2,026,976 votes, 
Edgar Tekere won 413,840 votes. Given the lack of a strong party structure, and a more 
credible leadership, ZUM put up a creditable performance. As one commentator 
noted, ZUM had "exposed armed emperors, broken the new taboo on organising against 
the family and given anti-party sentiments representation" (Sylvester 1990,400). 
Yet it is clear that ZUM did not provide a credible alternative to ZANU (PF). Its lack 
of an alternative economic programme was always apparent, stressing a rightwing 
pro-market liberalisation programme. The Government's 1991 Structural Adjustment 
Programme has subsequently taken the wind out of ZUM's economic sails. Moreover, 
ZUM did not address their programme to the rural areas, where the Government's 
record on improvements could not be ignored. As a result, ZANU (PF)'s strength 
remained in the rural areas. The demise of ZUM since the 1990 election has exposed 
its weakness in both policy and structure. Having done itself no credit by allying with 
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the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe, the former Rhodesian Front, it has since failed 
to tackle the substantive issues effecting working people and has been unable to develop 
a greater constituency amongst the latter. The limitations of its project have thus been 
exposed. 
Apart from ZUM, the student movement's activities from 1988 expressed strong 
opposition against the one-party state and corruption. Demonstrations on and off the 
campus of the University of Zimbabwe strongly condemned the ruling party in a 
language that shattered the mould of reverence to leadership. In this vein one document 
declared in 1989: "That one fought for this country does not justify them to loot, plunder 
and wreck the economy of Zimbabwe, let alone stifle people's democratic rights." Apart 
from the heavy-handed treatment of the students by the riot police, the Government 
hastily passed the University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act in December 1990, granting 
more power to the State and University authorities to deal with dissent on the campus. 
The Act has been severely criticised for reducing the autonomy of the University by 
granting authoritarian powers to the Vice-Chancellor and Government authorities. 
Despite the protests of students and, for the first time, a demonstration by 200 academic 
staff, the Act was gazetted in 1991. 
Amongst academics and students, the ruling party has lost a great deal of legitimacy. It 
is not only that the attacks on academic freedom and open debate have been condemned; 
it is also that the material position of staff and students has been eroded since 1980. This 
has, unfortunately, left academics open to the largesse being offered by dubious donor 
agencies for research into democracy. Thus for some of the "retreating intellectuals", to 
use James Petras' phrase, democratisation focusing on a narrow set of formulas and 
structures has become a major theme. 
Significant in the one-party state debate has not only been opposition from groups 
outside the ruling party, but the criticisms from within ZANU (PF) itself. During 
Central Committee meetings, in both August and September 1990, legislating for a 
one-party state was strongly opposed by many members, including Senior Ministers 
(EIU Country Report 1991,10). The former President, Canaan Banana, argued for the 
continuation of a multi-party system because of his belief that "no generation has the 
right to make immutable decisions for future generations" (Banana 1990,21). The issue 
of democratisation was also raised with reference to inner party democracy during the 
course of the preliminary party elections in February 1990 to elect candidates to stand 
for Parliament in the 1990 national elections. The preliminaries, the first of their kind 
since 1980, produced some serious challenges to senior Party officials with the 
constituency members asserting their right to choose members representative of their 
interest. This democratic process unnerved many of the Party leadership, and also led 
to a series of blatant ethnic rivalries, most notably in Mashonaland Central. Two weeks 
of exciting political activity ended with "tears, joy fights, regionalism, feasting 
and finally, dictatorship prevailed" (Parade, April 1990,18). 
The one-party state issue has displayed the vibrancy of debate in Zimbabwe, which has 
ensured that any attempt to arbitrarily impose a one-party machinery on the society will 
be met by serious opposition from groups in civil society and within the ruling party 
itself. Moreover, contradictions amongst the petty-bourgeoisie, a central feature of 
contemporary Zimbabwean politics, over the accumulation process, are likely to 
continue to produce ethnic and ideological divisions which will make it difficult for a 
section of the petty-bourgeoisie to impose its one-party state project. There is no doubt, 
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therefore, that those in ZANU (PF) advocating a one-party state have had to take heed 
of the varying shades of internal opposition on this issue. The lifting of the State of 
Emergency in 1990 also provided a more relaxed atmosphere for such dissent to manifest 
itself. Nevertheless, it must also be emphasised that the demise of the Cold War and 
the changed balance of international forces provided the critique of one-party 
dictatorships with a new generalised force. Along with this, the loss of legitimacy of 
vanguardist nations of a sole and authentic party or liberation movement has also 
undermined the grand assertions of the one-party state trajectory. Without this force of 
international pressure, it is unlikely that the internal opposition forces would have had 
a similar effect. 
For the time being, the one-party state debate has been put to one side. In the 
meantime, however, the office of the Executive Presidency, legislated in 1987, has been 
strengthened in relation to other State institutions and civil society. The extent to which 
the one-party state issue is raised in the future will depend on the outcomes of the overall 
process of the struggle for democratic development within the country. The results of 
this process in turn will, amongst other factors, depend not only on the contradictions 
amongst the petty-bourgeoisie, but on the extent to which progressive sections of that 
class are able to form alliances with the majority amongst the popular classes. The 
success of such alliances will depend, firstly, on the conditions for mobilisation and 
organisation; and, secondly, on the ability to depart from and break down old moulds of 
mobilisation to produce more democratic forms of participation. It is appropriate, 
therefore, to turn to the problems of labour and the land to assess the strength and 
potential of the largest sections of the popular classes. 
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SECTION IV 
LAND, LABOUR AND THE POPULAR CLASSES 
Labouring Under Independence 
Historically, the labour movement in Zimbabwe has been weak, characterised by 
divisions on racial lines; sectionalism; low national density; political factionalism; elitist 
and undemocratic structures. The conditions under which such weakness developed 
included the rural-urban totality of the proletarian process, the acute devaluation of 
African labour power, and the extreme differentiation of the labour market and 
occupational structure (Wood, 1988). On the attainment of independence, workers 
used the new environment as an opportunity to vent their grievances. During the first 
two years of independence, the economy witnessed a spate of approximately 200 
countrywide strikes, covering all economic sectors. The strikes were an accumulated 
expression of anger at the wage levels, discriminatory practices and repressive labour 
dispute mechanisms that had been inherited from the colonial period. More than that, 
however, the extent of industrial action also indicated the levels of expectations and very 
real will for change amongst workers. The labour movement, plagued by a legacy of 
problems, proved unable to fully connect with the rhythm and intensity of the strikes. 
Workers themselves, not surprisingly, concentrated their activities on the immediate 
issues at hand, with little or no long-term conceptions of their actions. Even as the 
capitalist production relations in the economy threw up the potential for struggle, the 
ideological conceptions of this struggle were largely short-term and defensive. The State 
may have been alarmed at the extent of the strikes, but could not have been surprised 
at this expression of frustration. The major objectives of the State under these 
conditions were to bring the strikes to a halt, resume existing production levels, establish 
communication links with the workforce, and reassure the employers that while the State 
was eager to rectify the injustices suffered by labour, it was not in any mood to carry out 
a radical deconstruction of the settler colonial relations of production. 
The outcome of such struggles has been that the post-colonial state has sent 
contradictory and increasingly disturbing signals over the maintenance of minimal 
reformist propositions on the labour question. Included in the immediate post-1980 
labour policy, spurred on by the 1980/81 strikes, was the introduction of minimum wage 
legislation, an Employment Act that attempted to curb the arbitrary retrenchment of 
labour by employers, the introduction of shopfloor workers' committees, State 
involvement in an attempt to "build up" the ZCXU, and the introduction of a Labour 
Relations Act to guarantee certain fundamental rights of workers. Coinciding with the 
period of immediate post-independence euphoria, the explosions of labour unrest were 
able to exploit the temporary receptiveness of the State to labour issues. This 
receptiveness however, was always ambivalent, and as the divisions and lack of 
centralised authority of the unions became more evident and the employers recovered 
from their initial defensive stance, the changing balance of forces produced less than 
sympathetic State responses. The use of the State's coercive machinery against striking 
workers characterised its commitment to gradual reformist labour policies within 
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existing production structures. Accompanying this, intermittent accusations from the 
highest levels of State and Party have been made against "selfish" and "irresponsible" 
workers, whose role in the struggle has been brought into question, and whose 
"privileged" position vis-a-vis the peasantry has been invoked: a latter-day nationalist 
rendition of the labour aristocracy thesis. 
For the labour movement the task of becoming more effective has centred around three 
issues: Developing on autonomous position from the State without sacrificing the 
opportunities to use the State to advance the interest of labour whenever possible; 
developing broader alliances with other sections of the popular classes disadvantaged 
by the policies of the post-colonial State; mobilising membership from the workplace 
by providing effective union leadership on issues affecting workers. 
The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was initiated by ZANU (PF) in 1980 
in order to create a central trade union body more amenable to a corporatist solution 
to labour issues. Prior to the formation of the ZCTU, five trade union centres, namely 
the National African Trade Union Congress (NATUC), the Africa Trade Union 
Congress (ATUC), the Trade Union Congress of Zimbabwe (TUCZ), the Zimbabwe 
Federation of Labour (ZFL) and the Zimbabwe African Congress of Unions (ZACU) 
had already combined to form the United Trade Unions of Zimbabwe (UTUZ). The 
latter organisation, in seeking recognition by the new State, saw the request fall on stony 
ground. In a letter from the Joint Chairman and Joint Secretary of the interim 
committee of UTUZ, to the Minister of Labour and Social Services, the unionists 
complained bitterly about the State's negative attitude towards their attempts at a 
confederation of labour: 
We are, however, surprised and, indeed dismayed that, in spite of the fact that you Comrade 
Minister are aware of our efforts, and the stage already reached in this direction with the holding 
of an Inaugural Congress under consultation approved by your Ministry, you have deemed it fit to 
disregard this genuine effort, and have encouraged the creation of another National Trade Union 
Centre, completely ignoring the UTUZ, which was, and in fact is, the major representative 
organisation in regard to unifying the trade union body.2 
Moreover, in a letter from the Acting General Secretary of UTUZ to the Director of 
the International Labour Organisation in December 1980, the former commented on 
the Coordinating Committee chosen to form one national trade union centre, in the 
following terms: 
Unfortunately, the committee personally invited by the Minister contained no less that eight people 
who had not worked in industry or represented a trade union movement as such, but were 
appointees of the political party in power. These, along with six other people who were not 
representative of the trade union movement as a whole, left only six places for the genuine trade 
union representatives and leaders of properly registered trade unions under the auspices of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act of this country. 
Thus the Zimbabwean State, reluctant to have to deal with a labour confederation 
formed independently of the State and whose political affiliations were more towards 
ZAPU and ZANU (Sithole), went ahead with its own creation. The labour movement, 
for its part, too weak and divided along regional and political lines, was unable to prevent 
the formation of the new centre. During the early and mid-1980s, the imposed 
leadership of the trade union struggled for credibility amongst workers. Moreover, its 
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lack of a democratic base and dependence on outside funding, compounded by the 
State's delay in the introduction of a check-off system, led its members into a series of 
corrupt practices which left a blemish on the record of the movement (Government of 
Zimbabwe 1984). During this period the State, at its worst, was disdainful of the role of 
the trade union movement, exemplified by the manner in which the 20 seats formerly 
reserved for whites were reallocated in 1987. As we have already observed, while 
representatives of capital were invited to participate in a form of sectoral interest 
representation, in the case of labour not even a formal pretence was made to include 
representatives of the labour movement within this interest group machinery. The State 
felt strong enough to dismiss labour to the sidelines, "speak" for the labour movement 
annually through the announcement of the minimum wage and through the Labour 
Relations Act, and effectively make striking an unlawful activity, backed if necessary by 
the coercive arm of the law. 
By the late 1980s relations between the State and the labour movement began to change. 
The labour movement, having removed the more corrupt elements in its leadership, also 
applied itself more carefully to democratic accountability. Moreover, cracks in the 
State's attempted corporate strategy were becoming increasingly apparent. While 
minimum wage legislation has improved the purchasing power of agricultural and 
domestic employers, for workers in commerce and industry the minimum wages, at 1989 
prices, have dropped to 13% below their 1980 purchasing power level (Tsvangirai, 
1990a). This decline, however, must be assessed along with the phenomenal increase 
in social expenditure since 1980. Significantly, the drop in purchasing power has also 
affected the professional groups such as nurses and teachers, who in 1990 conducted the 
longest strikes in post-independence labour history. Along with other urban groups, 
these professionals have also suffered from the housing and transport crisis and the 
escalating cost of living. As one observer put it, teachers have found themselves "slipping 
in relation to other occupations which they have always considered less desirable than 
teaching" (Ndlovu 1990,22). 
The growth of union activity in the public sector reflects the change in employment 
patterns over the last decade. While in the formal productive sector only 20,000 to 
30,000 new jobs have been created annually, in the areas of public administration, 
education and health employment grew from 128,200 in 1980 to 220,300 in 1989. 
Moreover, hitherto, public sector unionism has not been significant in the overall labour 
movement, largely because under existing legislation trade unions have not been 
allowed to exist in this sector. However, the erosion of professional status and earning 
power has been an important recruiter of these sections of the labour force to union 
activity. There is an interesting parallel between the condition of professionals in the 
1940s and their position in 1990. As Ian Phimister has written about the forties: 
At the very moment that the number of black entrepreneurs, teachers and other professionals, 
skilled artisans and semi-skilled operatives was growing, their position relative to other classes and 
groups was under assault from inflation (Phimister 1988,265). 
However, while in the 1940s this loss of status pushed elements of the petty-bourgeoisie 
to invest their previously elitist demands with the broader social content of nationalism, 
the trajectory of the current professional involvement in broader struggles is still 
ambivalent. While there is definitely an opportunity for the growth of a broader labour 
movement composed of a wide cross-section of occupational groups pushing at the very 
least for more welfarist policies, there is also the danger, and in the short-term the more 
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likely prospect of professional workers supporting more individualist programmes 
promising the return of elite status and greater social mobility. The support of sections 
of the professionals for ZUM thus had more to do with bread and butter issues than 
opposition to a one-party state. Such a development could cause further divisions in the 
labour movement, particularly given the inability of the current industrialisation process 
to create large numbers of jobs in the formal sector. In recessionary periods unions are 
known to follow more defensive strategies catering for their own particular interests. 
The prospects are interesting, but by no means guaranteeing a general movement to the 
Left. 
The autonomy of the ZCTU has been further demonstrated by the increasingly critical 
position of the movement on economic and political issues. The movement criticised 
the new Investment Code in 1989 claiming that it demonstrated "much more pertinently 
than ever the Government's avowed commitment to capitalism" (ZCTU 1989). At the 
May Day 1991 celebrations the ZCTU, adopting the theme "Liberalisation or 
Liberation", attacked the Government's Structural Adjustment Programme, noting that 
the policies would increase the hardships up to poor (The Herald, 2 May 1991). On the 
political level, the movement has expressed opposition to the Government's treatment 
of the student movement in the latter's struggle against Government corruption and the 
one-party state. Links between the student and labour movements have begun to grow, 
although they still remain tenuous. 
Beginning its post-independence history from a weak, divided and dependent position, 
the labour movement has grown in stature and independence. The ZCTU is now 
affiliated to by 29 unions with a membership of about 200,000 workers; if one adds to 
this the membership of the Organisation of Collective Cooperatives of Zimbabwe 
(OCCZIM) whose membership numbers 250,000, then that raises the strength of 
unionised labour to 450,000 (Sachikonye 1990, 8). Naturally, this growing strength and 
autonomy of the labour movement has not gone unnoticed by the State. Dismissive in 
their attitude to the ZCTU's request for Parliamentary representation in 1987, ZANU 
(PF) made strong attempts to persuade the movement to give it unqualified support in 
the 1990 elections. While the courtship of the labour movement continued with the 
appointment of one of the vice-presidents of the ZCTU as Deputy Minister of Labour, 
Manpower Planning and Social Welfare in the post-1990 election Cabinet, for the most 
part the movement has resisted this recent attempt at cooptation by the State. As a 
general position, the ZCTU declared a position of neutrality in the last general elections 
(Tsvangirai 1990b, 28). Sachikonye (op. cit.) has clearly summarised the breakdown of 
the State's corporatist strategy: 
From about 1987 onwards, one could speak of a growing polarisation between State and Unions as 
the contradictions engendered by an austerity programme characterised by static employment and 
wage levels, higher prices and tighter controls on the labour process festered. The critique by 
Unions of State economic and social policies gets sharper. The orientation and performance of 
labour relations officers is questioned. More recently the terms on which the State intends to 
liberalise the economy are sharply attacked. At the same time, stoppages over wages and working 
conditions in a number of industrial scctors illustrate the sharpening contradictions within the 
labour process. Finally, when the ZCTU Secretary-General condemns the State's handling of the 
student demonstrations at the University and hints at a Union response he is detained. The limits 
of what has been termed "corporate paternalism" are demonstrated. 
As the blocks of the State corporatist strategy have crumbled, the new adjustment 
programme, with its attendant liberalisation of labour relations, has initiated a new 
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emphasis by the State on attempting to control unions through the market mechanism. 
By this is meant that the process through which formal bargaining rights and power 
granted to unions have limited economic impact, since the restrictions under which they 
have to operate render them relatively ineffective (Valenzuela 1989,448). It remains 
to be seen how effectively the unions will be able to operate under these conditions. 
Even as the labour movement has made important strides over the last ten years, it still 
faces enormous problems in mobilisation, organisation and engaging in the process, with 
other classes, of challenging the Structural Adjustment orthodoxy. A recent study of 
five trade unions in Zimbabwe noted that: 
Half of the number of workers we interviewed did not know anything about unions at all. Of the 
other half, many of them were members of the union some time in the past but resigned becausc 
they said they no longer had confidence in the union, or that the unions are powerless, or that they 
were useless anyway (Peta et al 1989,9). 
Hence apart from the structural constraints of the economy and the problem of certain 
aspects of State policy and legislation, unions continue to face obstacles such as lack of 
education of members and leaders, and a serious inadequacy of means of 
communication, to develop a public sphere through which working people may come to 
recognise themselves, their problems and their common interests. 
However, one of the most fundamental issues that will determine the trajectory of the 
labour movement will be its ability to deal with the rural-urban linkages of the labour 
force, and hence the land question. As has been well illustrated by other scholars, the 
result of the cumulative effects of land expropriation, labour migration and changed 
cropping systems is that the wage relation has become a critical factor in the survival of 
rural households. In order to avoid exposure to hunger, rural households have been 
forced to rely on diversified income sources. One of the most important and reliable of 
such sources has been the remittances from urban wage employment (Jackson et al 
1987). Urban wage earners in turn faced with low wages, inadequate pensions and 
welfare payment, and a risk of unemployment, continue to retain their access to land as 
some guarantee against unemployment, old age and retirement (Bush and Cliffe 1984; 
Potts and Mutambirwa 1990). Therefore, a fundamental aspect, not only of the cost of 
reproduction of labour power, but also of the mobilisation of labour, relates to the Land 
Question. There are signs that the leadership of the labour movement are beginning to 
take the rural-urban alliance more seriously and linking such an alliance to future 
political strategy. The Secretary-General of the ZCTU observed in an interview that: 
The workers will always have a role, since they are the producers. They should not advocate 
workerism because 80 percent of our population are peasants. What they should do is to try and 
link up workers and peasants into strong structures to advance their interests. That's the only way 
we can draw the ruling party away from the right wing and convert it to our own purpose 
(Tsvangirai, 1990c). 
Tsvangirai's statement expressed very clearly the labour movement's dual strategy of 
establishing an autonomous presence while wringing as many concessions as possible 
from the State and ruling party. 
In the mobilisation of workers the major problem of worker consciousness is raised 
especially within the context of the rural-urban totality we have been discussing. In the 
discussion of worker consciousness in both the liberal and certain strands of the radical 
historiographic traditions, the grand trajectory of proletarianisation and progress has 
raised the "modernist spectre of backwardness" when discussing rural linkages 
(Ferguson 1990, 618). Cheater's (1988) critique of such models in the Zimbabwean 
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context, though ending up in a retreat into relativism, does make important points about 
the problems of applying linear models of proletarianisation to Zimbabwean workers. 
For any strategy to successfully mobilise "workers- peasants" the idea of placing such 
producers on a linear continuum of consciousness will have to be shelved. As Ferguson 
has warned, it is the complex reality between the "stick figures" of migrant labourer and 
permanent urbanite that needs to be understood more clearly (op cit, 620). It is this 
reality that raises major strategic and organisational problems not only for the labour 
movement in Zimbabwe but for any force on the Left envisaging a peasant worker 
alliance. 
Democratisation and the Land 
Even as the legitimacy of the ruling party has been eroded among the petty-bourgeoisie 
and labour in the urban areas, the support for ZANU (PF) in the rural areas has still 
remained relatively strong. This was evidenced in the 1990 elections when ZUM made 
no inroads at all into the rural support of the ruling party. Thus the peasant support that 
was mobilised to a significant extent during the war was consolidated through several 
policy measures designed to improve the livelihood of the rural population. These 
measures included rural resettlement; a rapid expansion of education and health 
facilities; provision of agricultural State services such as extension, credit and marketing 
services; and an expansion of physical infrastructure such as road and water supplies 
linked to a policy of growth points and district service centres (Wekwete 1988). 
Notwithstanding these interventions the Land Question remains a fundamental 
problem in Zimbabwe. 
The current status of land ownership in the country stands as follows: Large-scale 
commercial farmers 11.5 million ha; small- scale commercial farmers 1.5 million ha; 
communal area farmers 16 million ha; and resettlement land brought by the 
Government 3.9 million ha (Parade, October 1989). While in 1980 commercial farming, 
including settler farmers and multinational-owned agro-industries, occupied 42% of the 
land, by 1989 the 4, 319 registered commercial farmers owned 29% of the land (Ibid). 
The resettlement programme has been relatively limited. By 1985 only 35,000 families, 
of the targeted 162,000 families set in 1982, had been resettled. The First Five-Year 
National Development Plan (1986-90) set a new resettlement figure of 15,000 families 
per year. By the beginning of 1989 only 16,000 more families, over the 1985 figure, had 
been resettled (Moyo 1990a, 14). The other aspect of Government policy, namely 
support for communal area farmers, has led to high increases in production, but this 
success has not been across the board. Variations in agro-ecological zone infrastructural 
development, ratios of arable to grazing land, population densities and quantities of 
remittances to rural families have accelerated the process of differentiation in the 
communal areas (Sunga et al 1990). To a great extent, poor and middle peasants are 
forced into selling their labour power, as they face extreme pressures in meeting the 
reproduction costs of the family from their own subsistence production. Moreover, 
women face the brunt of this hardship, for while they constitute the majority of the 
communal farmers, few have powers with regard to land use rights (Ibid). The 
production boom in the communal areas has, therefore, not been an homogeneous 
process. For the majority of communal area farmers, land productivity for most crops 
and livestock remains well below the level attained by large-scale commercial farmers. 
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Moreover, less than 25% of communal area farmers have contributed to the increased 
performance (Moyo 1990b). 
It is clear, therefore, that to date the post-colonial State's agrarian policy for the majority 
producers has been confined to an incremental set of measures, defining the Land 
Question largely in terms of resettlement and increases in State services. The concern 
with continuity of production and the need for foreign exchange, so often argued by 
white communal farmers, has kept attention focused on immediate balance of payments 
problems, rather than long-term structural considerations (Moyo and Skalnes 1990,10). 
The Structural Adjustment Programme is likely to strengthen this perspective. 
Continuing hardships, inequalities on the land and escalating unemployment brought 
the Land Question to the fore once again through the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
Amendment (No. 11) Bill brought before the legislature in December 1990. The latter 
Bill gives the State extensive powers to acquire land in local currency, at a price 
determined by principles of compensation specified by Parliament. Initially, the Bill 
was aggressively advocated by the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural 
Resettlement in a series of blunt confrontations with commercial farmers. At one such 
meeting he informed them that: 
The responsibility of this Government is to get land and give it to the landless. We will go ahead 
with this programme... and the status quo where vast fertile tracts of land are owned by the few 
individuals will not continue (Financial Gazette, 22 February 1991). 
Speculation has been rife as to how far the Government will use its new powers to 
confront entrenched interest on the land issue. At this point, however, there seems little 
reason to believe that the State will move substantially beyond its existing policy of 
gradually supporting small Black farmers, cooperatives and State farms without risking 
major falls in production, employment and exports in the established White-dominated 
commercial sector. There are several reasons for taking this view. Firstly, the recently 
introduced Structural Adjustment Programme places primary emphasis on production 
for export and foreign currency earnings. It is highly unlikely at this stage that the State 
is in a position to depart from this trajectory. Moreover, it was clear from the Paris 
Donors' Conference in March 1991, where the Senior Minister of Finance, Economic 
Planning and Development produced supportive documentation from Zimbabwe's 
commercial farming community that the Government intends to continue its cautious 
approach to land reform. Within the current conjuncture, the commercial farming lobby 
will continue to assert its strength. Secondly, State and Party officials have been 
purchasing land in increasing numbers, with one estimate placing the number of 
commercial farms owned by Blacks at a figure of 300 (Moyo 1990a, 18). Recently, 
emergent Black commercial farmers stated their intention to form a separate 
organisation to press for their own interests. Given these developments, serious land 
redistribution may soon run counter to the interests of these groups except insofar as 
such redistribution increases their own land ownership. Thirdly, there are already 
indications from the various farming bodies, and signals from the State, that any future 
reform must be less concerned with need than with proven farming ability. The 
vice-presidents of both the National Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ) 
representing the 800,000 communal farmers and the Zimbabwe National Farmers' 
Union, representing the approximately 9,000 small-scale commercial farmers, have 
already urged the Government to resettle only competent farmers and graduates from 
agricultural colleges (Farming Gazette, 21 December 1990). The Government in its 
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National Land Policy has also expressed the need to resettle farmers with established 
ability, and to establish a sub-sector in which Black capitalist farmers will be trained and 
financed (Cliffe 1991,28). Fourthly, no new financial impetus for land reform was given 
in the 1991-92 Budget. The Government allocated Z$15 million for land acquisition, 
and Z$22 million for infrastructure development of resettlement areas. These 
correspond to only 1.5% of PSIP. As Robinson has noted, it remains to be seen how far 
the GOZ utilises accumulation from the healthier parts of the economy to stimulate 
growth in the underdeveloped sectors (Financial Gazette, 26 July 1991). Moreover, this 
is not just a technical question of resource transfers, but relates to the balance of social 
forces within the country, which will determine the forces best able to organise for the 
mobilisation of resources in their interests. 
In addition to these factors must also be considered the lack of organised pressure from 
the bulk of the peasantry not represented by existing farmers' organisations. The 
post-1980 years saw the breakdown of war-time mobilisation and local committees, and 
the concentration of Government energy on the implementation of top-down initiatives 
in local government. Rural and District Councils are heavily dependent on Central 
Government grants and decision-making (Helmsing 1990; Kavran 1989). VIDCOs and 
WADCOs intended to become vehicles for active participation and involvement remain 
an insignificant part of the planning process (Gasper 1990,23). Peasant responses where 
they have occurred thus far have tended to be localised and under the hegemony of an 
elite-led national organisation or planning machinery. Where the State's provision of 
social services has failed, NGOs have tapped into the needs of peasants and in many 
cases initiated their own agenda in such areas. In the case of squatters, able occasionally 
to overrule the minimal State presence, in certain areas, and encouraged by Party leaders 
at both local and national level, peasants have been able, at certain times, to impose 
their demands (Herbst, 1990, 80). However, this kind of intervention has not been 
unambiguous, sometimes concealing the patronage of aspiring politicians and the 
accumulative manoeuvrings of aspiring entrepreneurs (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989,113). 
Finally, the course of producer and marketing cooperatives has been littered with 
obstacles. In an important study of cooperatives in Zimbabwe. Yash Tandon (1988) has 
expressed the central fallacies in the State's perception of collective cooperatives. He 
has criticised both the planning model that surbodinates the human factor to the 
demands of production and the expectation that cooperatives would simply follow the 
production experience of large-scale commercial farms, without taking into account the 
demand of the peasants, and the current realitie s of Zimbabwe's agrarian problem. As 
a result, members of the collectives have become labourers, much as on capitalist farms, 
in conditions of low productivity and income levels. A consequence of these low 
incomes and inadequate social services has been that the morale of the membership has 
been seriously affected (Moyo et al 1991). Many members regard the farms as the 
property of the Government, with their real interests concentrated on the two to four 
acres of land given to each on the farm (Tandon op. cit.). Against such odds the 
constraints facing the majority of rural producers are formidable. Under such conditions 
Cliffe (1988) is correct when he writes that, supported by the struggles of urban workers, 
peasants in Zimbabwe "can only look to the small but significant minority of radicalised 
politicians and civil servants who are still seeking to act out some of the democratic and 
liberating aspirations of the nationalist struggle". This may seem a pessimistic view of 
the future, but it is a realistic one. Having said this it must also be acknowledged that 
as the current form of resettlement programme reaches a levelling off in terms of 
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SECTION V 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever attempts are made at radical transformation in Zimbabwe will, to a significant 
extent, depend on the determinate factor of external pressures from international 
capitalist relations. While domestic political movements will attempt to negotiate 
problems between desirable objectives and the constraints of "feasibility", the pressures 
from international capital will continue to be applied in order to ensure conditions under 
which the only "feasible" option is a deepening structural integration into the 
international division of labour. Serious efforts to ensure national sovereignty over 
decision-making will have to confront the lethal effects of these corrosive pressures. 
The 1980s witnessed the destructive onslaught of neo-classical theory in the malevolent 
form of structural adjustment. To obtain the necessary international finance, developing 
countries have been forced into a long-term debt servicing burden from which they have 
no chance of extricating themselves. Out of the attempted implementation of these 
doctrinal distortions, African countries have on the whole emerged weakened, in the 
sense that the latter have increasingly lost their sovereignty over the determination of 
national policies. There is no reason to believe that Zimbabwe's fate with Structural 
Adjustment will be any different. Moreover, the collapse of Stalinism has given more 
legitimacy to those forces, national and international, who have been trying to "kill the 
dream" of radical alternatives in Southern Africa. 
While any perceptions of Zimbabwe's future must be punctuated with question marks, 
the most realistic picture to present must be based on a critical assessment of the existing 
social forces in the country and their relation to the international balance of forces. 
From the above analysis of the Zimbabwean situation it is fair to say that, as elsewhere 
on the continent, even as objective conditions cry out for a radical democratic 
denouement, the popular forces remain relatively weak. However, there are also 
indications of a strengthening of certain popular organisations, like the labour 
movement, and the potential for radicalisation of sections of the petty-bourgeoisie, as 
eroding economic conditions present increasing dilemmas about the future. Yet a most 
problematic aspect of the equation remains the party that will lead the necessarily harsh 
and lengthy battle against capital in Zimbabwe. ZANU (PF) remains the dominant 
party force in the country, and at present there are no viable alternatives to the Left of 
the political spectrum. Moreover, it is not even clear what such an alternative force 
could be expected to carry out under the present constraining conditions, in the country 
and within the region. As matters stand there have been increasing signs of the rightward 
drift of the ruling party. The "Left" within the Party as well as outside of it has grown 
increasingly isolated, and without an opposite pole of attraction. Yet it is also clear that 
there are strong dissenting voices within the Party on the question of democratisation. 
However, at present the centre-right drift of the Party seems more likely to continue 
into the near future. These are pessimistic times for the grand narratives of socialism, 
which have rightly come under critical scrutiny. Nevertheless, there is a vacuum in terms 
of alternatives, into which imperialism, an unfashionable word, continues in its current 
mood of triumphs, to press its own disastrous imperatives for the future. In the darker 
visions of the omniscience of imperialism it has often seemed that there is no significant 
role for African interventions, and that all the continent appears to do is to plug into 
international circuits. It has never been easier to slip into such a fatalistic position as at 
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present. Yet imperialism has never been such a totalising presence, and African 
interventions have played their role in the dramatic changes of our dramatised century, 
not least in the struggle for Zimbabwe. It is, therefore, with an embattled optionism 
that the future needs to be faced. 
Notes: 
1. Information quoted on the Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC) was 
collected during an interview with the Secretary-General of the organisation, Mr 
Strive Masiyiwa, during an interview on 25th March 1991. 
2. Details on the ZCTU are taken from my forthcoming ZIDS paper on "The State 
and the Labour Question in Zimbabwe". 
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